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INTRODUCTION 
This essay considers the important but under-explored link 
between politics and constitutional interpretation in the realm of 
national security. The school of constitutional interpretation at 
which it looks is "presidential exclusivity," which has gone from 
relative obscurity to prominence in the political branches and in 
public debate over the past several decades. Exclusivists deem 
the President to have substantial discretion under Article II of 
the Constitution "to override statutory limits that he believes 
interfere with his ability to protect national security."1 
Exclusivists often claim that they champion a return to the 
presidency's traditional role.2 Yet other scholars, particularly 
David Barron and Martin Lederman in a two-article series in the 
Harvard Law Review, have shown that exclusivity has only 
recently become a presence, let alone a prominent and 
influential one, in the political branches.3 
* Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. I am very grateful to 
Dale Carpenter, David Dana, and Jill Hasday for extremely thoughtful comments. 
1. Heidi Kitrosser, It Came From Beneath the Twilight Zone: Wiretapping and 
Article II Imperialism, 88 TEXAS L. REV. _ (forthcoming 2010) (internal citations 
omitted). 
2. See, e.g. , JOHN Yoo, WAR BY OTHER MEANS 119-25 (2006); U.S. DEP'T OF 
JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT 6-7, 29-35 (2006) (hereinafter DOJ 
WHITE PAPER) ; Abraham D. Sofaer, Separation of Powers and the Use of Force, in THE 
FETTERED PRESIDENCY 15, 18-20 (L. Gordon Crovitz & Jeremy A. Rabkin eds., 1989); 
Gary J. Schmitt & Abram N. Shulsky, The Theory and Practice of Separation of Powers: 
The Case of Covert Action, in THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY, supra, at 59, 61-62. 
3. See generally David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief 
at the Lowest Ebb-A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941 , 1027 (2008); David 
J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb-Framing 
the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2008). See 
also, e.g. , Kitrosser, supra note 1, at _ (exploring the recent rise of exclusivity within 
the political branches in the context of wiretapping). 
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The first question that this essay takes up is why exclusivity 
has come so far over the past several decades in the political 
branches and why it has demonstrated appeal and staying power 
across parties. Such a question admittedly lends itself to no 
magic bullets, no one factor or handful of factors to explain 
everything. Yet logic suggests that political incentives must 
constitute at least an important piece of the puzzle, and that is 
the piece on which this essay focuses. 
The upshot is this: Since roughly the end of World War II, 
with a notable exception in the post-Watergate period ,  it has 
increasingly been in the interests of congresspersons to be 
perceived as non-obstructionist toward whatever activities the 
President deems necessary to advance national security. To 
avoid the dreaded "weak on national security" label, and to 
balance that avoidance against the risk of seeming either a 
presidential lackey (particularly if the President is of a different 
party) or of being implicated should scandals emerge (think Iran 
Contra or Abu Ghraib ), congresspersons are generally best off 
appearing tough and resolute, while retaining the ability to plead 
ignorance should things turn out badly. These incentives are 
captured in a statement reportedly made in 1973 by Senate 
Armed Services Committee Chairman John Stennis (D-Miss.) to 
CIA Director James Schlesinger: " 'Just go ahead and do it, but I 
don't want to know! "'4 Other former CIA Directors corroborate 
the ubiquity of this attitude among members of Congress. For 
example, former Director William Colby has said that "Congress 
is informed to the degree that Congress wants to be informed" 
and '"stressed . . .  that several [congressional] overseers had 
expressed little interest in briefings from the CIA.' "5 Happily for 
the President, these incentives complement his own. If it is 
politically problematic for a congressperson to be perceived as 
"weak on national security," it is the kiss of death for a President 
or presidential candidate. The President must straddle the line in 
public perception between seeming willing to "do whatever it 
takes" to protect national security and being able to credibly 
invoke American ideals of fairness and the rule of law. Of 
course, the President is also deeply invested in avoiding scandal, 
4. DENIS MCDONOUGH ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, NO MERE OVERSIGHT: 
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE IS BROKEN 9 (2006). 
5. Loch K. Johnson, "The Contemporary Presidency": Presidents, Lawmakers, and 
Spies: Intelligence Accountability in the United States, 34 PRES. STUDIES Q. 828, 833 
(2004). See also, e.g. , KATHRYN S. OLMSTED, CHALLENGING THE SECRET 
GOVERNMENT 42-44 (1996). 
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or at minimum, retaining plausible deniability should scandal 
develop over national security activities. 
Exclusivity, then, aligns with the political interests of nearly 
everyone in national political life. Embracing exclusivity enables 
Presidents and congresspersons to associate themselves with the 
iconic image of a tough President and to situate their allegiance 
to that image in a larger narrative of keeping faith with the 
Constitution. Furthermore, making or acquiescing in exclusivity 
claims enables one to suggest that the Constitution simply ties 
their hands, preventing them, for instance, from disclosing or 
demanding information or taking a clear, public stand on a 
controversial matter. While this is not the only explanation for 
exclusivity's rise in ubiquity and legitimacy among the political 
branches over the past several decades, it is an important part of 
the picture. 
This essay also considers how exclusivity manifests itself in 
the political branches. Exclusivity's manifestations are closely 
linked to its political appeal. The latter is contingent, after all, on 
the uses to which political actors are able to put exclusivity. In 
this respect, this essay observes that political branch players 
benefit as much if not more from exclusivity's shadow effect as 
from their invoking it explicitly. For example, however weak 
exclusivist arguments might be to the effect that the President 
had a constitutional power to secretly circumvent the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") for several years , the 
frequent repetition of these arguments by administration 
defenders created a fog of uncertainty around the issue among 
the public. This fog makes it more politically palatable for 
others, without invoking exclusivity explicitly, to suggest that the 
matter comes down to mere political differences, or that it is 
simply best to look ahead rather than to linger on complex 
questions of legal culpability. 
This essay also explains that the combined effect of 
exclusivity's many active and passive uses is that of an elaborate 
shell game. In this "Article II shell game,"  accountability is the 
palmed object and potential accountability mechanisms are the 
shells.6 If the game is well played, the public will often be told 
6. According to The Random House College Dictionary (1988), a shell game is "a 
sleight-of-hand swindling game resembling thimblerig but employing walnut shells or the 
like instead of cups." Id. at 1212. The same dictionary defines thimblerig as a "swindling 
game" in which "the operator palms a pellet or pea while appearing to cover it with one 
of three thimblelike cups, and then, moving the cups about, offers to bet that no one can 
tell under which cup the pellet or pea lies." Id. at 1365. 
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that accountability does not lie under one shell for exclusivist 
reasons, but that it may lie under the next shell, only for the 
process to repeat ad infinitum. For example, Congress may 
retroactively immunize certain groups for alleged statutory 
violations, partly on the basis that the legality question is 
uncertain in light of exclusivity. Members of Congress or 
witnesses supporting retroactive liability may argue, however, 
that other means for investigation exist such as congressional 
hearings. Later, those same persons or others may argue that 
congressional hearings ought not to occur or must be very 
narrow to avoid unveiling information that the President alone 
has the constitutional power- again, from an exclusivist 
perspective -to determine whether to reveal. To be clear, my 
claim is not that each participant subjectively intends, at the time 
that they raise a particular Article II objection, to close off other 
accountability avenues and thus to partake in a shell game. 
Rather, my point is that the increasing presence and perceived 
legitimacy of exclusivist arguments - and the incentive of 
political branch actors to raise or acquiesce in exclusivist claims 
or to benefit from their shadow effect - give rise to multiple, 
often successive exclusivist blocks to accountability. Thus, the 
effect is like that of a coordinated shell game. 
Part I of this essay discusses historical and cultural changes 
that make exclusivity increasingly attractive politically to 
Presidents and congresspersons alike. Part II summarizes some 
of the major ways in which politicians actively make use of, or 
passively benefit from, exclusivist invocations of Article II. Part 
III demonstrates that the overall effect of such uses is that of an 
elaborate shell game across branches, parties, and 
administrations. It illustrates this phenomenon through the 
example of the Bush Administration's "Terrorist Surveillance 
Program," or "TSP. "  Exclusivity contributed to the program's 
years-long secrecy, defenses of it after it was publicly revealed, 
and efforts across the Bush and Obama administrations to shield 
its participants from accountability. 
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I. THE AGGRESSION HEURISTIC, THE RULE OF LAW 
IDEAL, AND PARTISANSHIP: THE POLITICS OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY 
A. THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE AND THE AGGRESSION 
HEURISTIC 
While the United States was born out of war and was no 
stranger to war for its first two centuries, 
[i] t  was not until the Second World War that the United 
States, which heretofore had maintained small military 
budgets and a modest regular army, experienced a dramatic 
change in its world view. From then on this country has 
operated on the assumption that it faced a permanent 
national security emergency that had to be handled primarily 
by military means .. . .  Mobilization of the society for 'national 
security' has long been the substitute for total war.7 
While this passage was published in the midst of the Cold 
War, the staying power of the "national security state''8 that it 
describes was evidenced throughout the nineteen-nineties, when 
the large-scale military and national security infrastructure that 
had been built up since the Second World War-what President 
Eisenhower famously called "the military-industrial complex"9 -
continued, in some respects even broadened its activities, with 
retooled justifications.10 As historian Andrew J. Bacevich puts it, 
"at the end of the Cold War, Americans said yes to military 
power."11 From this perspective, Bacevich explains, the U.S. 
response to the tragic events of September 1 1th "demonstrates 
how little the unprecedented attacks [of that day] affected the 
assumptions underlying U.S. foreign policy; the terrorists 
succeeded only in reinvigorating the conviction that destiny 
summons the United States" and that military power is the 
means to achieve that destiny.12 
7. Richard J. Barnet, The Ideology of the National Security State, 26 MASS. REV. 
483, 483, 485 (1985). See also GARY WILLS, BOMB POWER: THE MODERN PRESIDENCY 
AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE 1-4, 57-59, 98-102, 237-40 (2010); ANDREW J. 
BACEVICH, THE NEW AMERICAN MILITARISM: How AMERICANS ARE SEDUCED BY 
WAR 16, 26-28, 32-33 (2005); Marcus G. Raskin, Democracy Versus the National Security 
State, 40 LAW & CONT. PROBLEMS 189, 196-99, 209-11 (1976). 
8. This term is commonly used to refer to the post-World War II state of affairs. 
See generally, e.g. , WILLS, supra note 7; Barnet, supra note 7; Raskin, supra note 7. 
9. Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People, 8 PUB. 
PAPERS 1035, 1038 (Jan. 17, 1961). 
10. See BACEVICH, supra note 7, at 19, 35, 53-59, 63-64, 79-90 (2005). 
11. Id. at 14. 
12. Id. at 13-14. 
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The rise of the national security state caused two crucially 
important shifts in American life and government. First, while 
the Constitution's founders detested the notion of a large 
standing army and took steps to ensure against the same, the 
U.S. now has a sprawling military and national security 
infrastructure etched deeply into its architecture. As late as 1939, 
the United States had only "a small standing army, spent 1.4% 
of the gross national product on defense, [and] had a handful of 
foreign bases. "13 While annual defense spending in the years 
since the end of World War II has had its relative ups and 
downs, it has remained substantially higher as a percentage of 
GDP and by other measures than in the years before 1940, with 
the exception of the World War I years. 14 
The second major shift brought about by the national 
security state is cultural. Between World War I and World War 
II: 
[A] U.S. Army chief of staff could veto plans for an airplane 
because it was immoral to bomb civilians. A secretary of state 
could reject plans for an intelligence operation because 
'gentlemen do not read each other's mail.' And j ust before 
World War I a president (Woodrow Wilson in 1915) could fly 
into a rage upon discovering that the army actually had 
contingency plans for fighting wars.15 
Even during World War II, members of Congress could publicly 
proclaim that the federal government should never wiretap and 
Congress could reject FDR's pleas to pass a statute authorizin§ 
wire-tapping and the use of wiretap-derived evidence in courts. 6 
Yet over the past several generations, mainstream consensus has 
shifted. In 1985, Richard Barnet made a striking set of 
observations that remain equally apt in 2010: 
[T]he national security state, despite its failure to deliver 
physical, psychological or spiritual security, enjoys the 
overwhelming support of the American public. And this is so 
despite rising concern about huge budget deficits substantially 
attributable to military expenditures and a disturbing increase 
in secrecy and surveillance in American life, all in the name of 
13. Barnet, supra note 7, at 485. 
14. See James L. Clayton, The Fiscal Limits of the Warfare-Welfare State: Defense 
and Welfare Spending in the United States Since 1900, 29 W. POL. Q. 364, 366 tbl.1, 368 
tbl.2, 369 chart 2, 370 tbl.3, 371 tbl.4 (1976). See also OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
HISTORICAL TABLES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 47-55 
tbl.3.1 (2010). 
15. Barnet, supra note 7, at 485. 
16. See Kitrosser, supra note 1, at_. 
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national security. 
The "engineering of consent" is crucial to the national 
security state. Edward L. Bernay's definition of public 
relations accurately describes the process by which the 
consensus on national security is maintained. Most Americans 
are inhibited from having or expressing personal convictions 
on matters relating to national security for a number of 
reasons. First, the topic is amorphous and seemingly complex. 
The masses of numbers about weapons, budgets, "kill ratios" 
and other bits of jargon make it seem almost hopeless to 
follow the "debate." Second, the great emphasis put by 
government on the creation of classified information and the 
highly publicized, though not always successful, effort to 
protect secret information, cause most citizens to believe that 
they do not know sufficient "facts" to challenge official truth. 
Third, the threat to the survival of the nation is invoked in 
17 support of every new weapons system. 
489 
The myopia of mainstream discourse is evident in politics, 
culture and journalism today.18 Particularly since 9/11 ,  such 
discourse has evinced a phenomenon that I call the "aggression 
heuristic." By the aggression heuristic I mean a presumption 
that, as between two national security policies, one that relies on 
"aggression" and one that does not, the former is more security­
enhancing. By aggression, I mean either violence or significant 
civil liberties incursions. The aggression heuristic exists despite 
the fact that evidence for the relative efficacy of particular 
17. Barnet, supra note 7, at 494-95. For an outstanding critique of academic 
arguments that champion deference to the executive branch through rationales similar to 
those described by Barnet, see Alice Ristroph, Professors Strangelove, 11  GREEN BAG 
2D 245 (2008). C.f Louis Fisher, The Law: Scholarly Support for Presidential Wars, 35 
PRES. STUD. Q. 590 (2005) (explaining, in article's abstract, that "political scientists and 
historians have . . . imbued the presidency with magical qualities of expertise and good 
intentions . . . . Supported by the academic community, presidents now regularly claim 
that the Constitution allows them to wage war against other countries without receiving 
either a declaration or authorization from Congress."); David Gray Adler, The Law: 
Textbooks and the President's Constitutional Powers, 35 PRES. STUD. Q. 376, 379 (2005) 
(college political science textbooks typically "prefer vanilla descriptions to constitutional 
critiques and criticisms," leaving students "untutored and thus unequipped to pose 
citizen challenges to executive claims of authority."). 
18. See, e.g. , WILLS, supra note 7, at 161-66, 238-40; BACEVICH, supra note 7, at 
14-15, 18, 90; Glenn Greenwald, The NYT's View of "Journalistic Objectivity'', 
SALON.COM, Dec. 23, 2009, http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2009/12/23/ 
objectivity/; Glenn Greenwald, The Foreign Policy Community, SALON.COM, Aug. 8, 
2007, http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2007 /08/08/powers/; Glenn Greenwald, 
The Washington Post, Dan Froomkin and the Establishment Media, SALON.COM, June 19, 
2007, http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2009/06/19/washpost/; Glenn Greenwald, 
Joe Klein and Beltway Seriousness, SALON.COM, July 26, 2007, http://www.salon.com/ 
opinion/ greenwald/2007 /07 /26/klein/. 
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aggressive measures at best is inconclusive.19 At worst, the 
evidence reveals that aggression often is counter-productive, 
making Americans less safe in both the short and long terms. 20 
That the aggression heuristic pervades mainstream thinking 
and politics is evidenced in a number of ways. First, public 
opinion polls routinely show that large numbers of Americans, 
often majorities, support aggressive techniques. For example, an 
April 2009 Gallup poll fourid that 55 % of Americans believe 
that the use of "harsh interrogation techniques on terror 
suspects during the Bush Administration" was justified, "while 
only 36% say it was not."21 Similarly, an August 2009 Rasmussen 
19. For example, a 2009 Inspectors General Report on the TSP and related 
surveillance programs explains that "[m]ost [intelligence community (IC)] officials 
interviewed by the [IC Inspectors General] had difficulty citing specific instances where 
[the TSP and related programs] had directly contributed to counterterrorism successes." 
It noted, however, that "[t]here are several cases identified by IC officials and in IC 
documentation where [the TSP and related programs] may have contributed to a 
counterterrorism success." OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GENERAL OF THE DEP'T OF DEF. ET 
AL., UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 36 (2009) 
[hereinafter IG REPORT]. 
20. See generally DA YID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY 
AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR (2007). See also, e.g. , Jane Mayer, 
Counterfactual, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 29, 2010, at 98 (detailing flaws in former Bush 
speechwriter's claims about the efficacy of enhanced interrogations and noting, among 
other things, that the speechwriter "does not address the many false confessions given by 
detainees under torturous pressure, some of which have led the U.S. tragically astray"); 
Charlie Savage and Scott Shane, Experts Urge Keeping Two Options for Terror Trials, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2010, at A15 (Bush and Obama Administration officials express 
concern that political pressures to hold only military commission trials are 
counterproductive to national security); Matthew Alexander, Torture's Loopholes, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, at A39 (former Air Force interrogator notes that in his experience, 
"torture or even harsh but legal treatment never got us useful information. Instead, such 
tactics invariably did just the opposite, convincing detainees to clam up"; abuse of 
prisoners is also used by al-Qaeda "as a recruiting tool"); What Went Wrong: Torture and 
the Office of Legal Counsel in the Bush Administration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
On Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the S. Committee on the Judiciary, 111th 
Cong. 22-46, 514-26 (2009) (testimony of Ali Soufan, Chief Executive, The Soufan 
Group LLC) (extensive analysis by former FBI terrorist interrogator as to the ineffectual 
nature of "enhanced interrogation" methods; among other things Soufan recounts his 
successes with non-enhanced methods on Abu Zubaydah and the failures of CIA 
contractors who took over with enhanced methods; Soufan also identifies falsehoods in 
examples given by Dick Cheney and others of enhanced interrogation's successes); 
Coleen Rowley & Other Intelligence Veterans, How Not to Counter Terrorism, 
CONSORTIUMNEWS.COM, June 18, 2007, http://www.consortiumnews.com/ 
2007/061807a.html (citing counter-productive nature of torture and of mass data 
collection-with respect to the latter, explaining that, in the wake of loosened restrictions 
on data collection, most data collected "will never be evaluated" and much will be 
irrelevant). 
21. Jeffrey M. Jones, Slim Majority Wants Bush-Era Interrogations Investigated, 
GALLUP.COM, Apr. 27, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/118006/Slim-Majority-Wants­
Bush-Era-Interrogations-Investigated.aspx. A somewhat curious twist, however, is that 
the same poll found that 51 % of Americans favor, though 42% of Americans oppose, an 
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poll found that 65% of U.S. voters "say it is at least somewhat 
likely that waterboarding and other harsh interrogation 
techniques helped secure valuable intelligence information." 
44% deemed it "very likely."22 And a nationwide Rasmussen 
telephone survey taken shortly after the attempted airliner 
bombing on Christmas Day, 2009 found that 58% of U.S. voters 
"say waterboarding and other aggressive interrogation 
techniques should be used to gain information" from the 
attempted bomber.23 Americans' assumptions about the efficacy 
of telephone wiretapping appear similar to those about torture. 
In the wake of the discovery that the Bush Administration had 
secretly approved the warrantless wiretapping of calls between 
the U.S. and abroad for several years through the TSP, despite a 
statute requiring warrants, a majority of Americans deemed the 
Bush Administration "right" to have done so in a USA Today 
Gallup poll. 24 
Politicians of both parties frequently behave in a manner 
consistent with the aggression heuristic. That is, they act as 
though their being viewed as averse to aggressive policies - or 
even supporting investigations of the same -is equivalent to 
being deemed weak on national security and is thus a political 
liability to be avoided. For example,  in 2008, a majority­
Democratic Congress facing a deeply unpopular Republican 
Administration passed legislation - the FISA Amendments Act, 
or FAA - granting the Administration much of the wiretapping 
authority that it had sought including retroactive immunity for 
telecommunications companies that had participated in the TSP. 
Many Democrats who initially opposed the legislation changed 
investigation into the use of such techniques. Id. Statistician Nate Silver explains Gallup's 
interpretation of the investigation findings: "this isn't really about torture-rather, it's 
about investigations. We Americans like to investigate! 'While a slim majority favors an 
investigation, on a relative basis the percentage is quite low because Americans are 
generally [more] supportive of government probes into potential misconduct by public 
officials."' Nate Silver, Explaining the Contradictory Torture Polling, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT, 
Apr. 27, 2009, http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2009/04/explaining-torture-polling.html 
(quoting Jones, supra). 
22. 49% Oppose Justice Department Probe of Bush-era CIA, RASMUSSEN 
REPORTS, Aug. 27, 2009, http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/ 
general_politics/august_2009/49_opposejustice_department_probe_of_bush_era_cia. 
23. 58% Favor Waterboarding of Plane Terrorist to Get Information, RASMUSSEN 
REPORTS, Dec. 31, 2009, http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/ 
general_politics/december_2009/58_favor_waterboarding_of_plane_terrorist_to_get_inform 
a ti on. 
24. USA Today Gallup Poll, http://ww .usatoday.com/newsipollsltables/Jive/2006-09-18-pollhtm, 
question #l 7(1ast visited May 17, 2010) (recording majority approval in polls taken Jan. 
6-8, 2006 and Sep. 15-17, 2006; recording sizable minority approval in polls taken Jan. 
20-22, 2006 and Feb. 9-12, 2006). 
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course, apparently responding to the political risk of appearing 
weak on terrorism. In championing the FAA, President Bush 
publicly stated that he would veto any bill that did not contain 
retroactive immunity, that a temporary set of FISA 
Amendments was soon to expire, and that Congress thus would 
leave dangerous intelligence gaps and make Americans 
vulnerable to terrorist attack should they not pass the FAA. 
Democrats who supported the FAA echoed President Bush's 
remarks. Diane Feinstein said that "taking no action means that 
we will be opening ourselves, in my view, to the possibility of a 
major attack."25 Then-presidential candidate and Senator Barack 
Obama also supported the FAA after having earlier vowed to 
oppose any legislation containing retroactive immunity. Citing 
national security, Obama said, "I felt it was most- more 
important for me to go ahead and support this compromise. "26 
Senator Russ Feingold, a Democrat who voted against both bills, 
dismissed these arguments as "the same old story. It's been the 
same ever since, basically, 9/11 .  Whenever the - ultimately the 
White House raises the specter of terrorism and even though it's 
clearly wrong on the merits, the -too many Democrats have 
caved."27 A piece in The Economist similarly surmised that "with 
'the war on terror' still a potent political issue, [Democratic] 
resistance could only last so long. "28 
A similar story can be told with respect to so-called 
"enhanced interrogation techniques."  For example, former FBI 
special agent Coleen Rowley and a group of intelligence 
veterans calling themselves "Veteran Intelligence Professionals 
for Sanity" recount that: 
Pragmatists (experienced intelligence and law enforcement 
professionals, in particular) oppose torture because it does 
not work and often is counterproductive. Nevertheless, the 
president grabbed the headlines when he argued on Sept. 6, 
2006 that "an alternative set of procedures" (already 
outlawed by the U.S. Army) for interrogation is required to 
extract information from terrorists. He then went on to 
25. David Welna, Democrats in Eavesdropping About-Face, (NPR radio broadcast 
June 26, 2008), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld= 
91934916&ps=rs. 
26. Id. See also Alex Koppleman, Obama Says He Supports PISA Compromise, 
SALON.COM, June 20, 2008, http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war_room/2008/06/ 
20/obama_fisa; Sen. Obama Issues Statement on FISA Bill, U.S. FED. NEWS, Dec. 17, 
2007 (earlier vow to support a filibuster of legislation with retroactive immunity). 
27. Welna, supra note 25. 
28. Guarding the Guards, ECONOMIST, June 28, 2008, at 36. 
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intimidate a supine Congress into approving such procedures. 
Virtually omitted from media coverage were the same-day 
remarks of the pragmatist chief of Army intelligence, Lt. Gen. 
John Kimmons, who conceded past "transgressions and 
mistakes" and made the Army's view quite clear: "No good 
intelligence is going to come from abusive practices. I think 
history tells us that. I think the emRirical evidence of the last five years, hard years, tells us that." 9 
493 
Here too, the aggression heuristic drove political and media 
discourse. Indeed, the heuristic's force was strong enough to 
withstand, with little contest, the pragmatic objections of 
intelligence veterans. 
Interestingly, the first year of the Obama Administration 
has seen aggression heuristic-infused push-back against 
perceptions that the Administration is not using or condoning 
sufficiently aggressive policies. The push-back comes from 
persons and groups ranging from members of Congress to 
organizations such as Elizabeth Cheney's "Keep America Safe" 
campaign.3° For example, as of this essay's writing in March 2010, 
a bi-partisan firestorm has been brewing against the 
Administration's announced plans to try some accused 9/1 1 
terrorists in the civilian court system rather than through 
military commissions.31 And initial bi-partisan support for closing 
the detention center at Guantanamo Bay crumbled over the last 
year in the wake of fears over the possible transfer to the United 
States of Guantanamo Bay prisoners.32 
This last set of examples - involving push-back against a 
President for appearing insufficiently aggressive-warrants a few 
preliminary observations. First, given significant continuities 
between the Bush and Obama Administrations on counter­
terrorism, it is a testament to the strength of the aggression 
heuristic and its perceived political currency that President 
29. Rowley et al., supra note 20. See also other sources cited supra note 20. 
30. See Keep America Safe, http://www.keepamericasafe.com/ (last visited May 17, 
2010) . 
31. See, e.g. , Savage & Shane, supra note 20; Anne E. Kornblut & Peter Finn, 
Obama Advisors Set to Recommend Military Tribunals for Alleged 9111 Plotters, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 5, 2010, at Al; Susan Crabtree, Gates, Holder Oppose Limiting Decisions on 
Where Executive May Try Terrorists, THEHILL.COM, Feb. 25, 2010, http://thehill.com/ 
homenews/administration/83839-gates-holder-say-they-oppose-legislation-limiting­
decisions-on-where-to-try-terrorists. 
32. See, e.g. , Charlie Savage, Plan to Move Guantanamo Detainees Faces New 
Delay, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2009, at Al; Charlie Savage, U.S. Said to Pick Illinois Prison 
to House Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2009 at A26. 
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Obama has faced substantial pro-aggression pushback.33 Second, 
so long as political incentives favor both aggression and 
mindfulness of rule of law ideals , it stands to reason that 
exclusivity will most often be used to defend aggressive behavior 
rather than non-aggression. From Congress' perspective, it is 
technically consistent to argue both that the President has 
discretion under Article II to act however he deems best for 
national security and that the President is using this discretion 
badly through insufficient aggression. Yet the two arguments sit 
somewhat uneasily next to each other when one considers that 
exclusivity is built partly on arguments that the President alone 
is structurally e�uipped to determine and carry out national 
security strategy. 4 Furthermore, exclusivity is surely in tension 
with legislative efforts to force the President's hand in more 
aggressive directions. Hence, where congresspersons seek to 
require more aggressive action - as in recent legislation 
restricting the transfer of Guantanamo Bay prisoners to the 
United States35 -they are likely to put exclusivist arguments to 
the side. From the President's perspective, there is some logic in 
invoking exclusivity across the board to defend both aggressive 
and non-aggressive decisions. We have seen some inkling of this 
approach from the Obama Administration -Attorney General 
Eric Holder and Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated that the 
President has discretion to determine where he tries suspected 
terrorists in response to demands for military commission 
trials36 - and it will be fascinating to see if this approach is used 
with any frequency. Still, insofar as political incentives continue 
to militate toward aggression, it is likely that the President and 
Congress both will typically embrace aggression while remaining 
mindful-rhetorically and perhaps more broadly- of the rule of 
law ideal. Thus, it seems most plausible that the President, like 
Congress, generally will continue to invoke exclusivity to favor 
aggression rather than to defend presidential decisions to forego 
aggressive behavior.37 
33. See, e.g. , Glenn Greenwald, Nostalgia for Bush/Cheney Radicalism, 
SALON.COM, Jan. 31, 2010, http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2010/ 
01/31/nostalgia. 
34. See Kitrosser, supra note 1, at_. 
35. Savage, U.S. Said to Pick Illinois Prison to House Detainees, supra note 32. 
36. Crabtree, supra note 31. 
37. For example, President Obama reportedly rejected suggestions to invoke an 
emergency power statute to help fund the transfer of Guantanamo Bay prisoners to 
Thompson Correctional Center in Illinois. While this approach would have relied on 
statutory authority and thus would have been less extreme than exclusivity, the President 
reportedly rejected the move on the basis that it would anger congresspersons critical of 
2010] ARTICLE II SHELL GAME 495 
B .  THE RULE OF LAW IDEAL 
A potential offset to the aggression heuristic is what I call 
the "rule of law ideal ." The rule of law ideal embodies concepts 
that are deeply embedded in our national psyche, concepts about 
which Americans have learned since grade school. They include 
the familiar notions that no one in the United States is above the 
law, that checks and balances prevent government tyranny, and 
that Americans greatly value freedom and the right to dissent. 
Of course, these concepts too often take the form of empty 
phrases or are even invoked to justify restrictions on freedom. It 
is not uncommon, after all, to hear a politician explain that civil 
liberties incursions are justified to protect freedom or to defeat 
those who "hate our freedoms. "38 Yet the concepts at their core 
have real content that resonates in U.S. history, culture, and 
politics. 
The rule of law ideal is evidenced in public opinion polls. 
Surveys reflect that Americans support transparency, checks and 
balances, and civil liberties as general matters. On the other 
hand, the aggression heuristic seems to overtake these ideals 
where a polling question situates rule of law values in the 
context of specific national security initiatives. In a summary of 
civil liberties and national security polling results from 2002-06, 
the Gallup organization explained: 
Numerous polling organizations have asked Americans for 
their views on civil liberties, the Patriot Act, wiretapping, and 
the government's collection of massive telephone records. 
The results produce mixed results depending on what is 
plans to transfer Guantanamo Bay prisoners to the U.S. Reportedly, the President was 
also concerned that the move might lead to the statute's rescission, a concern that is 
logically irrelevant from the perspective of exclusivity, whereby statutes can be 
circumvented when the President deems national security to demand it. See Savage, Plan 
to Move Guantanamo Detainees Faces New Delay, supra note 32. Additionally, as of 
March 2010, the Administration reportedly was very seriously considering reversing 
course on its plan to hold some civilian trials for detainees in the face of strong political 
pushback against the same. See Kornblut & Finn, supra note 31. 
38. Perhaps most famously, George W. Bush and his administration characterized 
the "war on terror" as a response to those who "hate our freedoms" and "a global 
struggle against the enemies of freedom." Matthew Davis, New Name for "War on 
Terror," BBC NEWS, July 27, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4719169.stm; 
Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress of the United States: Response to the 
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1140, 1141 (Sept. 20, 2001) . The 
rhetorical use of "freedom" to defend restrictions on freedom is hardly isolated or 
limited to anti-terrorism measures. For instance, Justice Stevens argued in a dissenting 
opinion that states should be permitted to ban flag burning in part because the flag 
"uniquely symbolizes" "ideas of liberty and equality." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 
439 (1989) (Stevens, J. , dissenting). 
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emphasized within the question. Polls on the one hand find 
some reluctance to give up civil liberties and concern about 
how far the government will go in this regard. On the other 
hand, polls that stress the positive aspects of the Patriot Act 
or positive reasons for restricting civil liberties find greater 
public support than those that do not.39 
The rule of law ideal also has some demonstrated political 
currency. This was perhaps most pronounced in the early 1970s, 
when a large group of "freshmen Democrats known as the 
'Watergate babies'"  was swept into office amid national 
perceptions of out of control presidential power.40 As a New 
York Times reporter put it at the time: 
What we are beginning to see here are the reactions to the 
misuse of Presidential power in Vietnam and Watergate. The 
Congress is determined to try to regain some of the power it 
lost or abandoned to the President in the postwar generation, 
to limit the scope of executive privilege, to limit the 
President's power to make war without the consent of the 
Congress, and to insist, if possible, that the President spend all 
funds appropriated by the Congress.41 
Landmark hearings were also held in both houses of Congress in 
the 1970s, examining in some detail intelligence and national 
security related abuses of the preceding several decades.42 In 
more recent times, perceived national security excesses in the 
Bush Administration led to some limited hearings and rebukes 
in Congress, at times from members of President Bush's own 
party.43 
As with public opinion, however, the rule of law ideal in 
politics is vulnerable to the appeal of the aggression heuristic 
when national security is invoked. Even during the post­
Watergate period, investigations and legislative proposals faced 
political stumbling blocks in the form of national security based 
objections.44 And angry talk by Republicans and Democrats 
alike about national security abuses have generally given way, in 
the post-9/1 1 era, to curtailed investigations, legislative 
39. Gallup's Pulse of Democracy: The Patriot Act and Civil Liberties, 
http://institution.gallup.com/content/?ci=5263 (last visited May 18, 2010). 
40. See Steven V. Roberts, House G. O.P. Freshmen are Speaking up on Party 
Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1979, at A16; James Reston, The Class of 1974, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 18, 1974, at 45. 
41. Reston, supra note 40. 
42. See generally, e.g. , OLMSTED, supra note 5. 
43. See, e.g., infra Part III.A.3.b.1; text accompanying note 56. 
44. See, e.g. , OLMSTED, supra note 5, at 2-9, 103-12, 121-43, 147-51, 154-89. 
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acquiescence to aggression, and legislative push-back against 
perceptions of insufficient aggression.45 
C. PARTISANSHIP 
The Constitution assumes that Congress and the President 
will keep one another in check as natural institutional rivals.46 
From this perspective, the President has incentives to defend the 
presidency against congressional encroachment and Congress 
has incentives to defend itself against presidential encroachment. 
Yet as an entire genre of literature is devoted to explaining, that 
plan hasn't worked out so well. Instead, history has seen the rise 
of an imperial presidency and a relatively quiescent, enabling 
Congress.47 One reason for the failure of founding assumptions is 
the rise of cohesive national political parties and Presidents as 
party leaders .48 The political fortunes of congresspersons are 
much more closely tied to their respective political parties than 
to the institutions in which they sit.49 Hence, members of 
Congress by and large are unwilling to challenge a President 
within their own party, even where the President steps on the 
powers and interests of Congress as an institution. 50 
It is self-evident why the "separation of parties, not 
powers" 51 lends itself to congressional acquiescence during times 
of unified government. Yet even during times of divided 
government, "members of the President's party are not likely to 
break ranks and vote to limit presidential initiatives." 52 This is a 
particularly strong impediment to Congress' ability to pass 
legislation over a presidential veto. 
45. See, e.g., infra Part III.A.3.b.1-2; supra text accompanying notes 25-28. 
46. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 317-20 (Madison) (Signet Classic 2003). 
47. The seminal work that describes this phenomenon is ARTHUR M. 
SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973). For a more recent take, see 
generally' CHARLIE SA v AGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (2007). 
48. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2313-14 (2006); Mark Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power in the 
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2673, 2678-79 (2005). 
49. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 48, at 2323; William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons 
Why Presidential Power Inevitably Expands and Why it Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505, 
518-19 (2008). 
50. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 48, at 2344; Marshall, supra note 49, at 518-19; 
Tushnet, supra note 48, at 2679. 
51. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 48. 
52. Neil Devins, Presidential Unilateralism and Political Polarization: Why Today's 
Congress Lacks the Will and the Way to Stop Presidential Initiatives, 45 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 395, 409 (2009). 
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More to the point, any challenge that divided government 
poses to the presidency tends to be overcome in the realm of 
national security, especially post-9/1 1 ,  by the aggression 
heuristic. The bipartisan impact of the aggression heuristic is 
demonstrated by the post-9/11 examples of deep congressional 
acquiescence during divided government detailed earlier. More 
generally, the phenomenon of bipartisan deference to aggressive 
presidential policies in the realm of national security and foreign 
affairs has been widely observed.53 
II. THE POLITICAL APPEAL AND USES OF 
EXCLUSIVITY 
If political incentives are an important part of their calculus, 
what, then, is a politician to do when it comes to national 
security? If the aggression heuristic were the only factor, then 
perhaps every day in politics would be like the Republican 
primary debate in May 2007 in which, responding to a 
hypothetical question about the actions that each would take as 
President after a terrorist attack, Representative Tancredo 
announced that he would be "looking for 'Jack Bauer,"' 
Rudolph Giuliani said that he would tell interrogators "to use 
every method they could think of," and Mitt Romney added for 
good measure that he wants "to double Guantanamo. " 54 Of 
course, the aggression heuristic is not limitless and does not exist 
in a vacuum. Despite the strength of both the heuristic and of 
partisanship, there are still potential political costs to being 
viewed as a mere presidential lackey, whether across party lines 
(think then-Democrat, now-Independent Joe Lieberman circa 
2006)55 or within the same party (think Republican Dan Burton 
reminding President Bush that "this is not a monarchy" in 
2001) .56 Nor is the rule of law ideal without any currency in the 
realm of national security. For example, politicians often strain 
to couple remarks to the effect that we must use any means 
necessary to interrogate terrorists with the caveat, "but not 
torture." 57 And surely Watergate, Iran-Contra and Abu Ghraib 
53. See, e.g., Devins, supra note 52, at 414-15; Marshall, supra note 49, at 518; 
Levinson & Pildes, supra note 48, at 2345, 2352; Tushnet, supra note 48, at 2678-80. 
54. Transcript of Republican Presidential Primary Debate at the University of 
South Carolina, May 15, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/15/ 
us/politics/16repubs-text.html. 
55. See Editorial, A Senate Race in Connecticut, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2006, at Cl1. 
56. See Ellen Nakashima, Bush Invokes Executive Privilege on Hill, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 14, 2001, at A43. 
57. For example, in the primary debate referenced above, Rudolph Giuliani 
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dwell within politicians' mental calculi, reminders of the political 
and legal risks of getting caught in an abuse-of-power scandal. 
Given these conflicting pressures, the political appeal of 
presidential exclusivity (again, at least insofar as it supports 
aggression) is substantial. From the President's perspective, 
invoking exclusivity enables him to combine the image of the 
tough and decisive leader with that of constitutionalism and the 
rule of law. As a practical matter, successful exclusivity claims 
enable him to duck much scrutiny. He can, for example, claim ex 
ante or ex post that he must forego congressional notification 
requirements in the name of national security. He can also seek 
to avoid judicial review by invoking the state secrets doctrine 
and to stave off statutory limits on that doctrine by claiming that 
they would violate Article IL The availability of exclusivity 
defenses may also embolden him to violate statutes in secret, on 
the theory that, if caught, he can claim an Article II based right 
to circumvent the statutes. Similarly, he can argue against 
congressional investigations of past statutory violations on the 
theory that the violations were legal from an exclusivity 
perspective and that Congress would therefore be investigating 
mere political differences. Depending on the composition of 
Congress, the President could add that Congress seeks to engage 
in a partisan witch-hunt over political differences.58 
For members of Congress, a variety of political factors ­
including whether a member shares a party affiliation with the 
President, the nature of a member's base (particularly in "safe" 
House districts where party base views are often politically 
determinative) , and whether a member has carved out a niche 
followed his remark that interrogators should "use every method they could think of" 
with the words, "It shouldn't be torture, but every method they can think of. " See 
Transcript, supra note 54. 
58. Arguments to the effect that investigations of the TSP or other aggressive anti­
terror programs are or could turn into mere "witch-hunts" that seek to criminalize 
political differences have been frequently voiced over the past several years from persons 
ranging from Presidents Bush and Obama to members of Congress to commentators 
inside and outside of government. See, e.g. , Looking Back in Anger, ECONOMIST, July 18, 
2009, at 29; Press Release, Sen. John Cornyn, President and American People Want 
Unity, Not Partisan Prosecutions and Witch Hunts (May 19, 2009) ; Josh Gerstein & 
Amie Parnes, Obama: Truth Commission is a Mistake, POLITICO.COM, Apr. 23, 2009, 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0409/21654.html; Getting to the Truth Through a 
Non-Partisan Commission of Inquiry: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, lllth Cong. 157-61 (2009) (statement of David B. Rivkin, Partner, Baker 
Hostetler); Scott Shane, To Investigate or Not: Four Ways to Look Back at Bush, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at WK3. Logically, these arguments benefit from the prevalence of 
exclusivist commentaries suggesting that the TSP and other statutory violations were or 
might have been legal. 
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reputation as one who stands up to abuses of power -may 
impact the degree to which it is in their interest to actively 
invoke exclusivity. Yet as we have seen, for many in Congress 
this position is indeed in their political interests. Rhetorically, 
invoking exclusivity enables a congressperson to show their 
support for a tough and in-command President and to wrap that 
support in the vestments of law and founding wisdom. Better 
still, exclusivity provides an escape hatch for members of 
Congress to avoid responsibility for that which may go wrong. 
After all, the gist of the exclusivity case is that the Constitution 
does not allow Congress to take certain actions, such as passing 
legislation to constrain particular national security activities or 
demanding information from the intelligence community in the 
face of national security based refusals.59 
Finally, exclusivity's advantages are not reaped solely by 
those who explicitly invoke it. Rather, exclusivity has an 
important shadow effect for the President and members of 
Congress alike, even where they choose (say, for fear of 
appearing to overreach in light of the rule of law ideal) not to 
invoke exclusivity explicitly. Take the example of arguments 
over whether to investigate past violations of statutes restricting 
torture and wiretapping. The frequently made exclusivist 
defense of such violations helped to create a sense in the public 
and political spheres that there is a legitimate legal debate on the 
matter, however tenuous exclusivist arguments might be. This 
sense helps to underscore the position that investigations would 
be undertaken solely for political gain and would unnecessarily 
59. John Hart Ely made a parallel observation about Congress' incentives with 
respect to decisions to go to or to remain at war. Congress' incentives, he explained, lend 
themselves to "studied ambiguity." John Hart Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part 
I: The (Troubled) Constitutionality of the War They Told Us About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 877, 
878 (1990). He also demonstrated, using the example of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution's 
repeal, how the combined effect of congressional and presidential incentives favor 
exclusivity: 
To a legislature unwilling either to stop the war or to take responsibility for it, 
the prospect of getting that incriminating Tonkin Gulf Resolution off the books 
must have seemed a godsend: "The . . .  debate made evident a Senate consensus 
that repeal . . . would 'wipe the slate clean' of any residual congressional 
authority for the Vietnam war and leave the President relying exclusively upon 
his powers as Commander in Chief." And to an executive interested in 
increasing presidential power-in attempting to set a precedent to the effect 
that troops can be deployed without congressional authorization-it must have 
seemed so too (particularly when the President in question could claim that this 
unpopular war wasn't really his, but his predecessor's). The repeal had it all: 
Congress could hide, and the President could aggrandize. 
Id. at 907 (quoting STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., 2D 
SESS., THE W AR POWERS RESOLUTION 1-202 (Comm. Print 1982) ) . 
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demoralize the intelligence community and harm national 
• 60 secunty. 
Another example of exclusivity's shadow effect involves 
White House failures to meet statutory requirements to share 
information with the congressional intelligence committees. The 
ubiquity of exclusivity in public and political discourse creates a 
setting in which the President can claim with relative political 
safety, should such transgressions later come to light, that he 
deemed the information too dangerous to share. While this is 
not an explicit exclusivist defense, an unspoken premise is that 
the President legally may circumvent statutory information­
sharing requirements. The more embedded this exclusivist 
premise is in the national psyche, the easier it is for the President 
to rely on it without invoking it and to get little political 
pushback for so doing. By the same token, the exclusivist 
premise removes much of the political onus from congressional 
committee members to push back (and to take on the political 
risks of so doing) should they learn that they have not received 
disclosures to which they are statutorily entitled.61 
III. THE ARTICLE II SHELL GAME 
Given the wide-ranging political appeal of Article II 
exclusivity and the varying ways in which it can be utilized, it is 
not surprising that its use has bridged parties and 
administrations since 9/11 .  This section focuses on exclusivity's 
use by Congress, the Bush Administration and the Obama 
Administration (through March 2010) in justifying the TSP and 
in shielding TSP participants from accountability through 
congressional or judicial inquiry. Similar accountability-avoiding 
moves have been used in other contexts in recent years, 
particularly with respect to the designation and treatment of 
terror detainees. For the sake of brevity, this section focuses on 
the TSP. 
As noted earlier, I refer to the pattern of activities and 
decisions chronicled here as an Article II shell game because it 
amounts to an indefinite bi-partisan, cross-administration, cross­
institutional pattern of accountability-avoidance. 62 The key 
60. See sources cited supra note 58. 
61. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 77-84. 
62. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Legal commentator Dahlia Lithwick 
more colorfully referred to an example of this phenomenon-the Obama 
Administration's avoidance of court review of Bush era extraordinary rendition 
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feature of the game is that at times, one accountability 
mechanism is thwarted in the name of Article II with assurances 
that alternative mechanisms lie ahead, only for the alternative 
mechanisms to be thwarted later by similar reasoning. The 
Article II shell game enables Congress and the President alike 
repeatedly to pay homage to national security and the rule of 
law while working to ensure that no one looks too closely at 
what is being, or has been, done. 
A. THE TSP'S INITIAL SECRECY AND LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS 
As of March 2010, many of " [ t ]he specific intelligence 
activities that were permitted by [Eost-9/11]  Presidential 
Authorizations remain highly classified ."  3 Thanks to admissions 
by the White House and the Department of Justice in the wake 
of revelations by the New York Times in December 2005 , 
however, we do know about the existence of the Terrorist 
Surveillance Program, or TSP, the program whereby the 
government intercepted calls between the United States and 
abroad without a warrant.64 This section focuses on how 
exclusivity enabled that program's secrecy for roughly four years 
and how exclusivity underscores defenses of the program. For 
precision's sake, it should be noted that some of the examples 
also involve efforts to foreclose inquiries into related and still 
not publicly described surveillance programs. The broader 
family of Bush Administration surveillance programs, including 
but not limited to the TSP, has been called the President's 
Surveillance Program, or "PSP."65 For ease of reference, the 
remainder of this section refers interchangeably to any programs 
within the PSP as the TSP or "the program."  
1 .  Exclusivity-Fueled Secrecy 
The TSP's roughly four-year secrecy was facilitated by the 
deeply ingrained exclusivist premise that the President alone 
must determine when information is too dangerous to be 
programs-as "judicial Whac-a-Mole . . . .  When another case pops up, the administration 
slaps it down." Dahlia Lithwick, Torture Roulette, Dec. 14, 2009, http://www.slate.com/ 
id/2238568/. 
63. IG REPORT, supra note 19, at 5. 
64. Id. at 5-6. The Report differentiates between the TSP, which has been publicly 
acknowledged, and the President's Surveillance Program or "PSP,'' which comprises the 
larger family of surveillance programs authorized through secret presidential 
authorization after 9/11 .  The PSP includes the TSP as well as other, still classified 
programs. Id. at 1, 5-6. 
65. See supra note 64. 
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revealed beyond select individuals. This power is manifested 
especially, though not exclusively, in the classification system.66 
In keeping with this premise, the White House- in large part 
through the Office of the Vice President, to whom the President 
had "delegated much of the national security portfolio,"67 and 
particularly through the Vice President's highly influential 
counsel, David Addington68 -tightly controlled access to 
information about the TSP.69 Plans for the TSP and other 
closely-held post 9/1 1 programs emanated from the self­
described "War Council," consisting of Addington, Office of 
Legal Counsel (OLC) Deputy Assistant Attorney General John 
Yoo, White House Counsel (later Attorney General) Alberto 
Gonzales, Timothy Flanigan of the White House Counsel's 
Office, and Pentagon general counsel Jim Haynes.70 
One of the most significant senses in which access to the 
TSP was restricted within the executive branch was that John 
Yoo- as the sole War Council member "with authority to issue 
[OLC] legal opinions that were binding throughout the executive 
branch"71 - essentially received carte blanche to issue legal 
opinions justifying the TSP without going through OLC's normal 
channels of review.72 This deeply insular process has since been 
blamed by subsequent Bush Administration OLC officials and 
by a July 2009 Inspectors General Report for substantial flaws in 
the opinions' legal and factual reasoning. Indeed, it was only 
after Yoo left the Department and was replaced by Jack 
Goldsmith, and then-Assistant Attorney General for OLC Jay 
Bybee became a federal judge and was replaced at OLC by 
Patrick Philbin, and Philbin, unlike Bybee, was "read in" to the 
TSP, that alarm bells were sounded by Goldsmith and Philbin as 
to the earlier opinions. What followed was a combination of 
withdrawn opinions, new opinions, and a now infamous internal 
revolt at the Department of Justice that reportedly led to 
changes in the TSP.73 As Goldsmith put it in retrospect, the War 
Council "dealt with FISA the way they dealt with other laws 
66. See Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Information Leaks and Free Speech, 2008 U. Ill. 
L. Rev. 881, 887-905. 
67. JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE 63 (2008). See also JACK GOLDSMITH, THE 
TERROR PRESIDENCY 76-77 (2007). 
68. See MA YER, supra note 67, at 63-64; GOLDSMITH, supra note 67, at 76-79. 
69. See IG REPORT, supra note 19, at 5-7, 10, 16; GOLDSMITH, supra note 67 at 
166-67, 181-82, 205-06; MAYER, supra note 67 at 68-70, 268-69. 
70. MA YER, supra note 67, at 66; GOLDSMITH, supra note 67, at 22-23, 98. 
71. GOLDSMITH, supra note 67, at 23. 
72. IG REPORT, supra note 19,  at 10-14, 19-20, 30. 
73. See IG REPORT, supra note 19, at 19-30. 
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they didn't like: they blew through them in secret based on 
flimsy legal opinions they guarded closely so no one could 
question the legal basis for the operations. "74 
Meanwhile, the congressional intelligence committees were 
also kept out of the loop prior to the press revelations of 
December 2005. This is so despite the statutory informing 
requirements of the National Security Act. One requirement 
mandates that the President "ensure that the congressional 
intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed 
of . . . intelligence activities . . . including any significant 
anticipated intelligence activity."75 Another requires the Director 
of National Intelligence [DNI] and the intelligence agency heads 
to "keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and 
currently informed of all intelligence activities,"  including 
through written reports on "significant anticipated intelligence 
activity. "76 
There is no dispute that the Bush Administration did not, at 
any point prior to the New York Times story, notify the 
congressional intelligence committees about the TSP. Instead, 
the Administration reportedly provided limited notification to 
members of the Congressional leadership, or "Gang of Eight. "77 
The Gang of Eight consists of the chairmen and ranking 
minority members of the congressional intelligence committees, 
the Speaker and minority leader of the House of 
Representatives, and the majority and minority leaders of the 
Senate.78 As I have detailed elsewhere, there is no credible 
argument that the TSP fell into one of the narrow statutory 
exemptions from disclosure.79 Presumably, the Administration 
relied on the premise that, even if the statutory informing 
requirements applied, it had the constitutional prerogative to 
override those mandates. 80 Indeed, while President Bush signed a 
2001 amendment that bolstered the National Security Act's 
74. GOLDSMITH, supra note 67, at 181. 
75. 50 U.S.C. § 413(a)(1) (2006). 
76. 50 U.S.C. § 413a(a)(1), (b). 
77. See, e.g. , ALFRED CUMMING, CONG. RES. SERV., STATUTORY PROCEDURES 
UNDER WHICH CONGRESS IS TO BE INFORMED OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, 
INCLUDING COVERT ACTIONS 6-7 (2006); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Chairman Splits 
With Bush on Spy Program, NY TIMES, Feb. 18, 2006, at Al; 154 Cong. Rec. S6456-59 
(daily ed. July 9, 2008) (remarks of U.S. Senator Russ Feingold in opposition to the FISA 
Amendments Act). 
78. CUMMING, supra note 77, at 5. 
79. Heidi Kitrosser, Congressional Oversight of National Security Activities: 
Improving Information Funnels, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1054-58 (2008). 
80. Id. 
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disclosure requirements, he wrote in a signing statement that the 
heightened requirements would, "in some circumstances . . .  fall 
short of constitutional standards" and that "the Act shall be 
construed . .  . in a manner consistent with the President's 
constitutional authority to withhold information the disclosure 
of which could impair foreign relations, the national security, the 
deliberative processes of the Executive, or the performance of 
the Executive's  constitutional duties."81 
It is also worth noting that, once the program was revealed 
in the press, the Bush Administration used its Gang of Eight 
notification to suggest that the TSP had been approved by 
Congress. 82 Thus, rather than pointing ahead to accountability 
that might occur down the road, the Administration suggested 
that it had already been held accountable. On the one hand, this 
is highly disingenuous given the exclusivity-fueled, 
administration-defined terms on which notification was 
provided. In addition to the limited number of persons informed, 
Gang of Eight notification sessions are notorious for failing to 
provide meaningful oversight. As a former congressional staffer 
writes: 
As a former legal counsel for both Republican and 
Democratic leaders of the House and Senate intelligence 
committees, I'm well aware of the limitations of these "gang 
of eight" sessions. They are provided only to the leadership of 
the House and Senate and of the intelligence committees, 
with no staff present. The eight are prohibited from saying 
anything about the briefing to anyone, including other 
intelligence panel members. The leaders for whom I worked 
never discussed the content of these briefings with me. 
It is virtually impossible for individual members of Congress, 
particularly members of the minority party, to take any 
effective action if they have concerns about what they have 
heard in one of these briefings. It is not realistic to expect 
them, working alone, to sort through complex legal issues, 
conduct the kind of factual investigation required for true 
oversight and develop an appropriate legislative response.83 
81. Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, 2 
PUB. PAPERS 1555 (Dec. 28, 2001). 
82. See Kitrosser, supra note 79, at 1058. See also, e. g. , Transcript: Interview with 
Vice President Cheney on FOX News Sunday, FOX NEWS, Dec. 22, 2008, http://www. 
foxnews.com/story/0,2933,470706,00.html. 
83. Suzanne E. Spaulding, Power Play: Did Bush Roll Past the Legal Stop Signs?, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 2005, at Bl. Senator Arlen Specter also has noted that, "[f]rom 
[his] experience as a member of the "Gang of Eight" when [he] chaired the Intelligence 
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On the other hand, members of Congress should not be 
permitted to wriggle off the hook entirely. Congresspersons 
could refuse to adhere to the Administration's restrictive terms, 
could insist that statutory disclosure rules are legally controlling, 
and could take their constitutional and policy arguments to the 
court of public opinion. Of course, this is where congresspersons' 
own political incentives come into play. As discussed earlier, and 
as the facts recounted here illustrate, it is often in the political 
interests of a congressperson, even one politically antagonistic to 
the President, to acquiesce in requests for national security 
secrecy. This, in turn, makes it in their interest to free-ride off of 
exclusivity arguments, regardless of whether they genuinely, 
even publicly oppose such arguments in general. Indeed, the 
specter of exclusivity (and hence of relative congressional 
helplessness) arguably redounded to the benefit of some 
Democratic Gang of Eight members who were criticized for not 
having reacted more forcefully when told of the TSP and other 
Bush Administration programs, and who were also accused of 
understating how much they knew about the programs.84 
Prior to the public revelations, then, the information control 
exercised or acquiesced in by Gang of Eight Members and the 
Bush Administration laid the groundwork for a shell game in 
several respects. First, the Bush Administration sought to use 
exclusivist information-control prerogatives to keep the TSP so 
tightly held as to avoid accountability (outside of a small and 
like-minded circle) in the first place. Second, the Administration 
built a foundation for later finger-pointing- and hence for 
accountability-shifting- by providing limited notice to the Gang 
of Eight. In the case of the program's public discovery, the 
Administration could, and eventually did argue that 
accountability had already occurred through Gang of Eight 
notification. Third, by acquiescing in such limited notice 
Committee of the 104th Congress, even that group gets very little information." Letter 
from Sen. Arlen Specter to Vice President Dick. Cheney (June 7, 2006), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_cr/specter060706.pdf. 
84. See, e.g., Walter Pincus, Spying Necessary, Democrats Say; But Harman, 
Daschle, Question President's Legal Reach, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2006, at A3. See also, 
e.g., Transcript: Interview with Vice President Cheney on Fox News Sunday, supra note 82 
(arguing that Gang of Eight was fully briefed on, made no objections to, and expressed 
full support of the TSP). An even more heated controversy arose over Nancy Pelosi's 
representations as to what she was and was not told in Gang of Eight briefings on the 
treatment and interrogation of terror detainees. See, e.g. , Scott Shane, CIA Reviewing Its 
Process for Briefing Congress, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2009, at A16; Walter Pincus, House 
Votes to Revise Intelligence Disclosure Rules for President, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2010, at 
A13. 
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procedures, Gang of Eight members retained the ability to claim 
that they were helpless to act and thus blameless in light of the 
restricted nature of the notice. 
2 .  The Exclusivist Defense of the TSP's Legality 
The TSP was defended internally prior to the 2005 press 
revelations, and publicly after the revelations, on the basis of 
exclusivist reasoning. The basic exclusivist argument is that 
Congress constitutionally may not restrict the President from 
engaging in intelligence gathering activities that he deems 
necessary to protect national security. Thus, PISA should not be 
construed to prohibit the TSP in order to avoid the 
constitutional question that would otherwise arise. Alternatively, 
if PISA is construed to prohibit the TSP, it is unconstitutional 
and can be circumvented by the President. 85 The substantial 
problems with this argument have been rehearsed at length 
elsewhere by myself and many others86 and the bulk of that 
discussion is beyond the scope of this essay. 
What is quite relevant, however, is that exclusivist reasoning 
typically is bolstered by assurances that the President bears 
political responsibilitl for how he uses his exclusive 
constitutional powers.8 Yet in light of the secrecy that exclusivity 
supports, such assurances, combined with exclusivist assertions, 
often amount to a multi-step shell game. Step one (assertion) : 
Congress may not limit the President through measures like 
FISA. Step two (assurance) :  Congress still retains checking 
power. It may make funding cuts, hold up presidential nominees 
in committee, or take other blunt retaliatory measures if it does 
not like the President's decisions and actions.88 Step three 
(assurance combined with assertion) : Congress may request 
information to discern the President's decisions and actions. 
Obtaining such information is a condition precedent to step two. 
However, the President retains the constitutional prerogative to 
refuse such information requests on the basis that fulfilling them 
85. See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 28-36. 
86. See, e.g., Letter from Law Professors Curtis A. Bradley, et al. to Members of 
Congress 3-7 (Jan. 9, 2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/doj­
response.pdf; Heidi Kitrosser, "Macro-Transparency" as Structural Directive: A Look at 
the NSA Surveillance Controversy, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1 163, 1 199-206 (2007); John Cary 
Sims, What NSA is Doing . . .  and Why It's Illegal, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 105, 128-32 
(2006). 
87. See Yoo, supra note 2 at 125-26. 
88. Id. 
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would harm national security or inhibit the candor of executive 
branch deliberations. 
Such shell games can span generations. For example, 
Robert Bork testified against FISA in 1978, prior to its 
enactment. He explained at the time that FISA "probably" 
violates Article II for exclusivist reasons,89 but that other 
accountability mechanisms remain without FISA. Referring to 
internal executive branch regulations in effect at the time, he 
stated: 
[I] t is impossible to imagine a President and an Attorney 
General who would be so foolhardy as to materially weaken 
their provisions. Furthermore, it is also true that there will be 
oversight by the Congress about the enforcement of such 
regulations, so I don't think we need to worry about future 
administrations j ust changin� them without anybody in 
Congress knowing about them. 0 
Of course, as we have since seen, it is entirely possible not only 
that a President would secretly circumvent or alter his own 
regulations but that he would secretly circumvent statutory law. 
As for congressional oversight, as we have seen it can be 
thwarted by exclusivity-fueled secrecy. 
The same may be said for another accountability avenue 
suggested in Bork's testimony, that an agent who violates 
internal regulations would "expose himself to criminal 
liability. "91 As discussed below, we have seen in both the Bush 
and Obama Administrations that civil judicial relief can be 
thwarted through state secrets arguments grounded implicitly or 
explicitly in Article II. An administration could decline to 
initiate a criminal prosecution on the same basis. Finally, to add 
a further twist to this cross-generational shell game, we have 
seen administrations, beginning with that of Ronald Reagan, 
invoke prosecutorial discretion to decline to prosecute members 
of their administration for actions, such as executive privilege 
based refusals to testify, taken in the name of Article II.9 
89. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
95th Cong., 131, 134, 137-38 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 FISA Hearings] . 
90. Id. 131. 
91. Id. at 135. 
92. Prosecution for Contempt of Congress of an Executive Branch Official Who 
Has Asserted a Claim of Executive Privilege, 8 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 101, 113-115 
(1984). See also EMILY BERMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: 
A LEGISLATIVE REMEDY 20 (2009). 
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3. Thwarting Accountability after the Public Revelations 
a. Foreclosing Judicial Review 
1. Statutory Immunity 
509 
One important means to uncover and punish illegal 
behavior is litigation. In the wake of revelations about the TSP, a 
number of lawsuits were filed against telecommunications 
companies for their alleged participation in the program. As 
discussed in Part I, in 2008 a majority-Democratic Congress, 
responding to pressure from President Bush and the constraints 
of the aggression heuristic, passed legislation geared toward 
ending these lawsuits. Title II of the FAA retroactively 
immunizes telecommunications providers who cooperated with 
the TSP from lawsuits, so long as the providers acted upon a 
written request "from the Attorney General or the head of an 
element of the intelligence community (or the deputy of such 
person) . . .  indicating that the activity was �i) authorized by the 
President and (ii) determined to be lawful."9 
Exclusivity played important roles - both explicit and 
implicit- in the campaign for retroactive immunity. First, some 
supporters of Title II argued that the TSP was clearly legal from 
an exclusivist perspective and that there was thus no illegal 
behavior to punish. "For example, Senators Bond, Chambliss, 
Hatch, and Warner criticized ' [t]hose who constantly harp on the 
misleading assertion that the TSP was illegal . '  The Senators 
expressed their belief, 'without any doubt, that the President 
properly used his authority under Article II . . . .  "'94 Second, 
some congresspersons and congressional witnesses made more 
subtle use of exclusivity, relying on the general sense of legal 
uncertainty to which exclusivist arguments gave rise. They 
suggested that telecommunications providers could not fairly 
have been expected to parse through difficult constitutional 
questions to second-guess government requests to cooperate 
with the TSP. For example: 
[F]ormer Deputy Assistant Attorney General Patrick Philbin 
told the Senate Judiciary Committee that it would have been 
unfair to expect telecommunications companies to examine 
93. PISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 802(a)(4)(B), 122 Stat. 
2436, 2469 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1885a (West 2010)). 
94. Kitrosser, supra note 1, at _ (quoting S. REP No. 110-209, at 32 (2007) 
(additional views of Senators Bond, Chambliss, Hatch, and Warner)). 
510 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 26:483 
the legality of presidential requests to cooperate with the 
TSP. He explained that "the legal questions . . . often involve 
constitutional questions of separation of powers that have 
never been squarely addressed by courts and are not readily 
susceptible for analysis by lawyers at a company whose 
primary concern is providing communications services to the 
public." Assistant Attorney General for National Security 
Kenneth Wainstein testified before the same committee in 
support of retroactive immunity. Wainstein also opposed 
Inspector General review of the TSP, deeming it best to 
"leave that aside in terms of . . . whether the TSP was within 
the constitutional authority of the president or not, legal or 
not, and just focus on how we're going to fix FISA for the 
American people."95 
Consistent with the Article II shell game, immunity 
proponents observed that other means for accountability existed. 
In particular, many pointed out that lawsuits against the 
government could still go forward. Yet as we shall see in the next 
section, lawsuits against the government and providers alike 
have faced another major blocking mechanism- one that spans 
the Bush and Obama administrations- in the form of the state 
secrets privilege.96 That roadblock, too, is underscored by 
exclusivist reasoning.97 
Of course, the adoption of retroactive immunity itself 
moved the accountability ball from its previous location in FISA. 
PISA had established its warrant procedures and enumerated 
exemptions thereto as the "exclusive means" to conduct 
wiretapping and had deemed non-compliant wiretapping legally 
actionable. Indeed, telecommunications providers had supported 
95. Kitrosser, supra note 1, at _ (quoting PISA Amendments: How to Protect 
Americans' Security and Privacy and Preserve the Rule of Law and Government 
Accountability: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary llOth Cong. 49 (2007) 
[hereinafter 2007 PISA Hearings] (statement of Patrick Philbin, Partner, Kirkland & 
Ellis); id. at 11 (statement of Kenneth L. Wainstein, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. 
Dep't of Justice)). See also Kitrosser, supra note 1, at _ (observing that Title II 
proponents also argued that it would have been particularly unfair to expect 
telecommunications providers to second-guess the government shortly after 9/11, but 
noting that these proponents ignore the fact that the government requests were 
reauthorized at regular intervals stretching well past 9/11). 
96. State secrets and related arguments also helped to deter the passage of 
suggested alternatives to retroactive immunity. Proposed alternatives included allowing 
lawsuits against the providers to proceed and indemnifying the companies, and allowing 
lawsuits to proceed but substituting the government for the providers as defendants. See, 
e.g. , 2007 PISA Hearings, supra, at 11-15, 18-19, 25, 33 (Statement of Kenneth L. 
Wainstein Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice), at 48-50 (Statement of 
Patrick Philbin, Partner, Kirkland & Ellis). 
97. See infra Part III.A.3.a.2. 
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FISA's passage on the basis that the legislation would give them 
clear guidance as to when they legally could - and could not­
comply with government surveillance requests .98 From this 
perspective, it is striking that immunity proponents argued, 
thirty years later, that telecommunications providers could not 
have been expected to assess the legality of government requests 
to participate in the TSP. 
Finally, one compromise accountability measure was 
included in the FAA: a requirement that the Inspectors General 
of the relevant intelligence agencies produce a regort on the TSP 
and release an unclassified version of the report. This provision 
led to a valuable unclassified report released in July 2009. That 
said, a purely internal check conducted by members of the 
executive branch is no replacement for meaningful external 
checks by Congress or the judiciary. Nor is the IG Report a 
comprehensive substitute for other accountability measures. For 
examrale, the Report does not offer a view on the legality of the 
TSP.1 0 And the IGs, who lacked the authority to compel 
testimony, were unable to obtain the cooperation of several key 
Bush Administration officials in preparing the report, including 
"Counsel to the Vice President David Addington, White House 
Chief of Staff Andrew Card, Attorney General John Ashcroft, 
DOJ Office of Legal Counsel Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General John Yoo, and former Director of Central Intelligence 
George Tenet. " 101 
2. State Secrets 
Dozens of lawsuits indeed were brought against 
telecommunications providers and the government regarding the 
TSP. Whether as intervenors in the cases against private 
companies or as defendants in cases against the government, the 
98. See 1978 FISA Hearings, supra note 89, at 90-102 (statement of H.W. William 
Caming, Attorney, AT&T) . See also 2007 FISA Hearings, supra note 95, at 49-55 
(statement of Morton Halperin, Director of U.S. Advocacy, Open Society Institute) . 
99. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 301, 122 Stat. 2436, 
2471-73; IG REPORT supra note 19, at Preface. 
100. Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, U.S. Wiretapping of Limited Value, Officials 
Report, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2009, at Al; Spencer Ackerman, Stuff That's Missing From the 
Inspectors General Report on Warrantless Surveillance, WASH. INDEPENDENT, July 10, 
2009, http://washingtonindependent.com/50443/stuff-thats-missing-from-the-inspectors­
general-report-on-warrantless-surveillance. 
101. IG REPORT, supra note 19, at 4. See also Carrie Johnson & Ellen Nakashima, 
'Inappropriate Secrecy' Hurt Surveillance Effort, Report Says, WASH. POST, July 11, 2009, 
at A3. 
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Bush Administration consistently sought to have the cases 
dismissed on the basis that they could lead to the disclosure of 
state secrets. The Obama Administration has followed suit, 
pursuing the state secrets argument with full force in TSP cases 
still pending when it took office. 102 
The Obama Administration followed the Bush 
Administration's lead not only in pursuing state secrets based 
dismissals, but also in arguing to courts that the privilege, while 
developed at common law, "has a firm foundation in the 
constitutional authority of the President under Article II to 
protect national security information."103 Both administrations 
invoked Article II to argue not only that the President has an 
inherent power to protect state secrets , but that at minimum 
there is a serious constitutional question as to whether that 
power is exclusive. In an April 2009 brief urging dismissal of 
Jewel v. National Security Agency on state secrets grounds, for 
instance, the Obama Administration "incorporate[ d] by 
reference [the government's] prior detailed discussion" to the 
effect that FISA should not be read to preempt the state secrets 
privilege.104 The referenced prior argument was made in two 
Bush Administration briefs in Al Haramain Islamic Foundation 
v. Bush.105 There, the government had argued, among other 
things, that a preemptive reading of FISA should be avoided 
because "any effort by Congress to regulate an exercise of the 
Executive's authority to protect national security through the 
state secrets privilege would plainly raise serious constitutional 
concerns, and it is well-established that courts should construe 
statutory law to avoid serious constitutional problems unless 
such construction is " 'plainly contrary to the intent of 
Congress. '"106 
102. Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. Penn. L. Rev. _ 
(forthcoming 2010) (detailing progression of the TSP cases and role of state secrets 
doctrine in the same). 
103. Government Defendants' Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss and for 
Summary Judgment at 12 n.9, Jewel v. National Security Agency, No. C:08-cv-4373-
VRW (9th Cir. Apr. 3, 2009), 2009 WL 944175 [hereinafter Jewel Motion to Dismiss]. 
104. Jewel Motion to Dismiss, supra note 103, at 23-24. 
105. Jewel Motion to Dismiss, supra note 103, at 25 n.25 (citing to briefs filed in al­
Haramain). 
106. Defendants' Notice of Motion and Second Motion to Dismiss in or, in the 
Alternative, for Summary Judgment in al-Haramain Islamic Foundation v. Bush, at 14, 
564 F. Supp. 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 07-cv-109-VRW), 2008 WL 5552047; see also 
Defendants' Reply in Support of Second Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for 
Summary Judgment in al-Haramain Islamic Foundation v. Bush, 564 F. Supp. 1109 (No. 
07-cv-109-VRW), 2008 WL 1956160. 
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The Bush and Obama administrations thus have both used 
the state secrets doctrine as a means to move the accountability 
ball further along, away from lawsuits against any party over the 
TSP. And both have deemed it at least strongly arguable, on 
exclusivist grounds, that Congress can not constitutionally curtail 
the privilege. Indeed, the Bush Administration directly objected, 
on exclusivist and other grounds, to legislation that Congress 
considered in 2008 to place limits on the doctrine.107 While the 
Obama Administration has not, as of this writing, spoken 
directly to that legislation - the State Secrets Protection Act, 
which was introduced in 2008 and again in 2009 -its exclusivist 
response to the claim that FISA preempts the state secrets 
privilege could obviously be applied to such legislation. 
Furthermore, the Obama Administration has issued policy and 
signing statements objecting to other information-sharing 
requirements on exclusivist grounds.108 Finally, it is worth noting 
that while the Obama Administration announced a new policy 
whereby it would seek to invoke the privilege only when 
necessary and as narrowly as possible in each case, this policy is 
entirely internal to the Administration. It provides no means for 
external accountability to check the Administration's use of the 
policy.109 Such external accountability mechanisms would, of 
course have to come from the courts or Congress. Yet the 
legality of such mechanisms is called into question by the 
exclusivist positions taken in the Bush and Obama 
Administrations. 
107. See Letter from Attorney Gen. Michael Mukasey to Sen. Patrick Leahy (Mar. 
31, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov I archive/ ola/views-letters/110-2/03-31-08-ag­
ltr-re-s2533-state-secrets. pdf. 
108. See Statement on Signing the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 DAILY 
COMP. PRES. Doc. No. 501 (June 24, 2009); Statement on Signing the Fraud 
Enforcement Recovery Act of 2009, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. No. 387 (May 20, 
2009); Statement on Signing the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. 
Doc. No. 145 (Mar. 11, 2009); Statement of Administration Policy: S. 1390-National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (July 15, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/sap_lll/saps1390s_20090715.pdf; Statement of 
Administration Policy: H.R. 2701- Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 
(July 8, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/sap_lll/ 
aphr3081r_20090708.pdf. 
109. See, e.g. , Christina E. Wells, State Secrets and Executive Accountability, 26 
CONST. COMMENT. 625 (2010). 
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b. Stymieing Congressional Inquiries 
1. During the Bush Administration 
Congressional oversight is another means to facilitate 
accountability over executive branch activities. As we have seen, 
the Bush Administration avoided meaningful congressional 
accountability about the TSP prior to the public revelations. 
Even after the public revelations and the rule-of-law-based 
political pressures that they engendered, and even after the 
Democratic take-over of Congress after the 2006 elections, the 
Bush Administration continued to resist oversight and 
investigation through congressional hearings, and Congress 
remained relatively quiescent. 
As before the public revelations, exclusivity played an 
important role in the Bush Administration's relationship to 
oversight after the revelations. Even when exclusivity was not 
invoked explicitly, exclusivist positions cast a large shadow over 
negotiations and plans for congressional hearings. One such 
position was the defense of the TSP's legality. The argument that 
the TSP was perfectly legal plainly cuts against the notion that 
the program was illegal and merits investigation. Furthermore, 
as in the immunity context, this defense underscored arguments 
to the effect that any investigations at best are much ado about 
nothing and at worst are partisan witch-hunts. The other 
exclusivist position that cast a shadow over the prospect of 
congressional investigations was the argument that the President 
must make the ultimate call as to when information should not 
be disclosed. In particular, a shadow was cast by the ever-present 
specter of executive privilege. An executive privilege claim is a 
claim that the President may, under Article II, withhold 
information on the basis that its disclosure would harm national 
security or threaten the candor of executive branch discussions. 1 10 
Though invoked relatively rarely, executive privilege casts a long 
shadow. Congress knows that an administration may "run out 
the clock" by claiming executive privilege until the public tires of 
a controversy, a special committee's tenure ends, or 
administrations change, and this naturally factors into their 
calculus. Furthermore,  like the exclusivist defense of the TSP's 
legality, the very existence of executive privilege doctrine helps 
to imbue administration refusals to provide information with a 
110. See Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege 
Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REV. 489, 491-92 (2007). 
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specter of legitimacy even when executive privilege is not 
invoked explicitly. 1 11 
In events bolstered by the shadows of both the exclusivity 
defense of the TSP and executive privilege, the Senate 
Intelligence Committee rejected calls in early 2006 to hold 
investigative hearings on the TSP.1 12 In return for the jettisoned 
hearings, the White House agreed to provide limited briefings to 
a special seven-person subcommittee.1 13 Such briefings were to 
be styled like Gang of Eight briefings, with briefed members 
barred from discussing the information with anyone else, 
including fellow congresspersons.1 14 Yet members of the 
subcommittee later complained that the Administration did not 
keep its word to brief them under even these restricted 
conditions. As subcommittee member Senator Rockefeller 
lamented in September 2006: 
For the past six months, I have been requesting without 
success specific details about the program, including: how 
many terrorists have been identified; how many arrested; how 
many convicted; and how many terrorists have been deported 
or killed as a direct result of information obtained through the 
warrantless wiretapping program. I can assure you, not one 
person in Congress has the answers to these and many other 
f d l . 115 un amenta questions. 
The Senate Judiciary Committee was somewhat more 
aggressive than the Intelligence Committee, holding oversight 
hearings on the TSP beginning in early 2006. Yet these hearings 
left much unexplored. For one thing, the Administration 
opposed the calling of some witnesses and the committee 
initially relented in their plans to call them.116 Two prospective 
witnesses whom the Justice Department opposed calling were 
former Attorney General John Ashcroft and former Deputy 
1 1 1. Id. at 500-01. 
112. See Dan Eggen & Walter Pincus, Ex-Justice Lawyer Rips Case for Spying, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2006, at A3; Editorial, The Death of the Intelligence Panel, NEW 
YORK TIMES, at A22; Patrick Radden Keefe, Orwell Would Be Proud, SLATE, Mar. 9, 
2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2137796/; Walter Pincus, Senate Panel Blocks 
Eavesdropping Probe, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2006, at A3. 
113. See Eggen & Pincus, supra note 112. 
114. Id. 
115. Glenn Greenwald, Voting in the Dark on Eavesdropping, SALON.COM, Sept. 26, 2006, 
http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war_room/2006/09/26/eavesdropping/index.html. 
116. See Maura Reynolds & Greg Miller, U.S. Lawmakers Signal Plans to Monitor 
Spying, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2006, at A21;  Eric Lichtblau & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Accord 
in House to Hold Inquiry on Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2006, at Al. 
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Attorney General James Comey.117 The Department explained 
that Ashcroft and Corney would have nothing to add to 
testimony already given by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales 
regarding the legal justifications for the TSP.118 In retrospect, the 
Justice Department's bland observation that Corney and 
Ashcroft had nothing to add was less than fully accurate. In May 
of 2007, Corney finally appeared before the then Democrat­
controlled Judiciary Committee, ostensibly to talk about the 
firing of U.S.  Attorneys. 119 When questioned about the TSP, 
Corney publicly revealed for the first time the existence of a 
dramatic internal administration rebellion over the TSP in 
2004.120 
The Bush Administration also sought to stymie Judiciary 
Committee inquiries on other occasions. At one point, for 
example, Vice-President Cheney successfully lobbied 
Republican members of the Judiciary Committee to oppose 
closed door hearings · with telephone company executives who 
had allegedly participated in the TSP.121 Furthermore, 
administration witnesses who appeared before the Judiciary 
Committee to discuss the TSP frequently refused to answer 
questions. 122 While the Administration did not formally claim 
executive privilege with respect to these hearings, it explained its 
intransigence by reference to the core justifications underlying 
executive privilege - the preservation of national security and 
deliberative candor in the executive branch.123 
Finally, when Congress granted retroactive immunity to 
telecommunications providers in the FAA in 2008, it did so 
despite complaints by many congresspersons that the 
Administration had refused to provide sufficient documentation 
117. Reynolds & Miller, supra note 116 (citing letter from Assistant Attorney 
General Moschella). 
118. Id. 
119. See David Johnston, Bush Intervened in Dispute Over N.S.A. Eavesdropping, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2007, at Al. 
120. Id. 
121. See Speech of Senator Specter on Senate Floor, 153 CONG. REC. S15,719-22 
(daily ed. Dec. 17, 2007) ; Letter From Vice President Cheney to Sen. Specter (June 8, 
2006) , 153 CONG. REC. S15720 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2007) ; Letter from Sen. Specter to Vice 
President Cheney (June 7, 2006) , 153 CONG. REC. S15,719-20 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2007) . 
122. See, e.g. , Wartime Executive Power and the National Security Agency's 
Surveillance Authority: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 17, 
78, 84, 93, 95-96, 102-03, 120-21, 151-52, 160-61 (2006) . 
123. See supra note 122. See also, e.g. , Letter from Assistant Attorney Gen. William 
E. Moschella to Sen. Dianne Feinstein (Feb. 28, 2006) , attachment at 10-11 ,  17-20, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/surveillancel 7.pdf. 
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for them to cast well-informed votes .124 At one point, the White 
House had disclosed requested documents to the Senate 
Intelligence Committee while refusing to disclose the same to 
the House Intelligence Committee and the House and Senate 
Judiciary Committees. A White House spokesperson explained 
that the Senate Intelligence Committee "showed a willingness to 
want to include in their legislation retroactive liability protection 
for companies that were alleged to have helped the United 
States in the days after 9/11 . . . .  Because they were willing to do 
that, we were willing to show them some of the documents that 
they asked to see." As for the other committees, she said, "I 
think that we'll wait and see to see who else is willing to include 
that provision in the bill. " 125 
There are two senses in which these examples fit into a 
larger narrative of an Article II shell game. First, the position 
that the President may circumvent FISA for a long period of 
time rests partly on the assurance that the President retains 
political accountability for such circumvention. Yet if the TSP's 
ostensible legality is used as a basis to thwart congressional 
hearings, then a major accountability avenue is eluded. The 
same is true where the basis for thwarted hearings is executive 
privilege, a related exclusivist claim about information control, 
or the shadow effect of such arguments. Second, stymied 
hearings do not exist in a vacuum. To the extent that other 
accountability mechanisms - such as judicial review- are also 
thwarted based on exclusivist reasoning, missed or stunted 
hearings are part of a larger pattern of Article II based 
accountability avoidance. 
2. During the Obama Administration (thus far) 
As President Obama took office, commentators speculated 
as to whether he would support renewed congressional 
investigations into the TSP and other Bush Administration 
terrorism programs. Some debated whether he might also or 
instead encourage Congress to create an independent 
investigative commission. A number of congressional Democrats 
championed such measures. 126 As of March 2010, however, it 
124. See, e.g. , Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 2007 Amendments Act of 
2007, S. REP. No. 110-258 at 19-20 (2008) (additional views of Sen. Leahy); S. REP. No. 
1 10-209, at 42 (additional views of Sen. Nelson), 46-48 (minority views of Senators 
Feingold, Wyden); 2007 FISA Hearings, supra note 95, at 2-5. 
125. Editorial, The Price of Admission, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2007, at A18. 
126. See, e.g. , Shane, supra note 58, at WK3; William Fisher, To Investigate Bush or 
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appears that neither the Administration nor sufficient numbers 
of congresspersons have had nor will discover the will to 
champion comprehensive new hearings or investigations.127 The 
reluctance seems attributable at least partly to a combination of 
the aggression heuristic and fears of being accused of running a 
partisan witch-hunt.128 A reticence to investigate also is partly 
explicable - and made more politically palatable, even politically 
beneficial-by exclusivity. 
For one thing, as we have seen, the frequent repetition of 
the exclusivist defense of the TSP helped to create a public sense 
that the program was legal or that at minimum the matter is one 
on which reasonable minds can differ. This sense, in turn, adds 
plausibility to the position that the nation ought not to linger on 
questions about the TSP. It also helps to soften any appearance 
of contradiction in statements by President Obama to the effect 
that by and large the nation should "mov[ e] forward" and resist 
backward looking investigations, but that " [t]hat doesn't mean 
that if somebodef has blatantly broken the law, that they are 
above the law. " 1 2  
Furthermore, President Obama's words and deeds since 
taking office indicate a willingness to make copious use of 
exclusivist objections to turning over requested information to 
Congress, including information about the previous 
Administration. The likelihood of such objections would surely 
Not, THE PUBLIC RECORD, Feb. 13, 2009, http://pubrecord.org/politics/1009/to­
investigate-bush-or-not/; David Johnston & Charlie Savage, Obama Reluctant to Look 
into Bush Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2009, at Al. 
127. See, e.g. , WILLS, supra note 7, at 237-41; Mayer, supra note 20, at 99; Matt 
Renner, Obama Administration Accused Again of Concealing Bush Era Crimes, 
TRUTHOUT, Oct. 12, 2009, http://www.truthout.org/10120912; Opinion, Derrick Z. 
Jackson, Cheney's Dark Side-and Ours, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 1, 2009, at A15; Scott 
Shane, Obama Faces a New Push to Look Back, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2009, at Al; Scott 
Shane, Lawsuits Force Disclosures by CIA, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2009, at A12; David M. 
Herszenhorn & Carl Hulse, Obama Resisting Push for Interrogation Panel, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 24, 2009, at Al. 
There has been some congressional inquiry over the past year into Bush 
Administration interrogation tactics. However, these hearings appear to have been fairly 
limited. Furthermore, some are classified and it is not clear when and if unclassified 
information from them will be made available. See, e.g. , Shane, Lawsuits Force 
Disclosure, supra; David Johnston, Bitter Start to a Hearing on Interrogation Tactics, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 14, 2009, at Al4; Herszenhorn & Hulse, supra; Mark Mazzetti, Senate Panel 
to Pursue Investigation of CIA, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2009, at A14. 
128. See supra note 58. 
129. Transcript of interview of President Elect Obama by George Stephanopoulos 
on ABC's This Week, Jan. 11, 2009, available at http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/ 
Economy/story?id=6618199 (while Obama made this particular comment in response to 
a question about a special prosecutor, he repeated his larger point about moving forward 
and balancing forward-movement with the rule of law many times in multiple contexts). 
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factor into decisions by congresspersons as to whether to hold 
hearings or to create an investigative commission. Indeed, the 
Obama Administration's first public statements on executive 
privilege arose in the context of attempts by the House Judiciary 
Committee to have former Bush Administration officials testify 
about controversial firings of U.S. Attorneys. A federal judge 
had denied the officials' claims of blanket immunity and the 
Obama Administration would have had to decide whether or not 
to appeal the ruling had a compromise not been negotiated 
between the committee and the officials. White House Counsel 
Gregory Craig explained the dilemma that the White House 
would have faced had the parties not reached a compromise: 
"The President is very sympathetic to those who want to find out 
what happened. But he is also mindful as President of the United 
States not to do anything that would undermine or weaken the 
institution of the presidency."130 Later in 2009, the Obama 
Administration raised eyebrows when it said that it would not 
permit its social secretary to appear before a congressional 
committee in regard to a controversy over security at a White 
House state dinner. White House press secretary Robert Gibbs 
stated that " [b ]ased on the separation of powers, staff here don't 
go to testify in front of Congress. "131 
The Obama Administration also has objected in several 
signing and policy statements to requirements that 
administrations share information with Congress.132 For example, 
the Administration objected on exclusivist grounds to proposed 
legislation to require notice to the full intelligence committees in 
circumstances where administrations currently have discretion to 
notify only the Gang of Eight.133 The Administration also 
threatened to veto an amended proposal, written in response to 
its initial objection, to allow Gang of Eight notice while 
requiring some general information - including the fact that 
more detailed notice was given to the Gang of Eight -to be 
provided to the full intelligence committees.134 
130. Jason Leopold, Conyers Cuts a Deal With Rove, Miers for Testimony in 
Attorney Firings, PUBLIC RECORD, Mar. 4, 2009, http://pubrecord.org/politics/1015/rove­
miers-to-testify-behind-closed-doors-about-attorney-firings/. See also, e.g. , Josh Gerstein, 
Rove, Miers to Testify, POLITICO.COM, Mar. 4, 2009, http://www.politico.com/news/ 
stories/0309/19631.html. 
131. Michael D. Shear, Government Openness is Tested by Salahi Case, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 4, 2009, at C7. 
132. See sources cited supra note 108. 
133. Statement of Administration Policy: H.R. 2701 -Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2010, supra note 108. See also, e.g. , Scott Shane, supra note 84, at Al6. 
134. See Letter from Peter R. Orszag, Director, U.S. Office of Mgmt. and Budget to 
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To the extent that the Obama Administration and many in 
Congress prefer to avoid congressional or independent 
investigations of the TSP, then, they benefit from the shadow 
effect of exclusivist arguments that have been advanced 
generally and with respect to the TSP in particular. These uses of 
exclusivity fit into the Article II shell game in the same way as 
did such uses during the Bush Administration. First, when the 
exclusivist defense of the TSP is bootstrapped to support the 
view that the TSP should not be investigated, the latter 
undermines the very premise of accountability that underscores 
the former. Second, congressional and independent oversight are 
hardly the only accountability mechanisms that have been 
stunted by exclusivity. Indeed, in public remarks in May 2009, 
President Obama explained his lack of enthusiasm for proposals 
to create an independent investigative commission partly by 
citing other accountability mechanisms. He maintained his belief 
"that our existing democratic institutions are strong enough to 
deliver accountability. The Congress can review abuses of our 
values, and there are ongoing inquiries by the Congress into 
matters like enhanced interrogation techniques. The 
Department of Justice and our courts can work through and 
punish any violations of our laws or miscarriages of justice. "135 Of 
course, we have seen that in the context of the TSP, the Obama 
Administration and others have helped to thwart some of these 
alternative accountability mechanisms. Hence, the accountability 
ball continues to move about, propelled by exclusivity among 
other forces. 
CONCLUSION 
Over the past several decades, exclusivity has gone from 
being a marginal and rarely invoked interpretive approach to 
one with substantial influence in legal and political circles. As I 
explain elsewhere, I find exclusivity to be deeply flawed, most 
fundamentally in its conflation of the President's capacities to 
act secretly and energetically with a legal prerogative to so act in 
the face of prohibiting legislation. 136 Nonetheless, those of us who 
consider exclusivity to be mistaken and even dangerous in its 
Sen. Diane Feinstein (Mar. 15, 2010), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/news/ 
2010/03/omb031610.pdf. See also, e.g. , Walter Pincus, White House Threatens Veto on 
Intelligence Activities Bill, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2010, at A4. 
135. Remarks at the National Archives and Records Administration, 2009 DAILY 
COMP. PRES. Doc. No 388 (May 21, 2009), at 9. 
136. See, e.g. , Kitrosser, supra note 1, at _. 
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effects ignore its growing significance at our peril. Furthermore, 
exclusivity's importance extends well beyond courtrooms and 
academia. It has gained much influence in the realms of politics 
and public debate. 
This Article has sought not only to convey exclusivity's 
rising political significance, but also to describe major factors 
that contribute to the same. The Article has also sought to 
examine some of the concrete ways that Article I and II actors 
use and benefit from exclusivity and the negative impact of these 
uses on government accountability. Understanding the politics of 
exclusivity might help in part to puncture the myth that 
exclusivity is simply a faithful reading of text, structure, and 
history. At a more basic level, exclusivity, whatever its legal and 
intellectual merits, is an important phenomenon within the 
political branches. This is particularly so in the realm of national 
security. If one is simply to understand the law and politics of 
national security, let alone to engage with it, exclusivity is a 
factor that ought not to be overlooked or underestimated. 
